Tucked away in the depths of those AI&R regs is clause 11(2)(a) which obliges RAIB to complete and publish its reports “in the shortest time possible and normally not later than 12 months after the date of the occurrence”. Although inclusion of the word ‘normally’ does give this generous deadline some elasticity, it’s reasonable to expect that all exceedances are supported by valid reasoning. It’s not a catch-all get-out-of-jail card.

Late in December 2008, RAIB published its Annual Report….for 2007! Spin doctors must now be on the payroll. Page 15 considers the Branch’s compliance with regulation 11(2)(a) by skillfully moulding facts into a distorted reality.

 “For investigations started in 2006 and published in 2007, the average time from the date of the incident to publication was 12 months” it states. Note the word ‘average’ - don’t be fooled into thinking that the 12-month deadline was ‘normally’ met. “For investigations started and published in 2007, the average time from the incident date to publication was 6½ months”. Of the 37 inquiries triggered in ’07, only 11 fell into this category. Not surprisingly, no mention is made of the 2005 probe which also surfaced during that year.

May 2008 saw the causes revealed of a derailment dating back to the autumn of 2006 - a 20-month turnaround - and, as we welcomed in 2009, no fewer than five reports from ’07 were still lost in RAIB’s black hole.

What’s more telling is to look at the Branch’s recent record in relation to ‘heavy rail’ events - those occurring on Network Rail infrastructure. Of its last 18 such inquiries, only half of them have emerged within the set timeframe. Four of those relied on the skin of their teeth.

Event	Description	Publication	Duration
27/06/07	Derailment at Ely	22/01/09	19 months
22/01/08	West Lodge Crossing fatality	20/01/09	12 months
16/04/08	Fatal accident on Moor Lane foot crossing	23/12/08	8 months
30/01/08	Near miss near Bishop’s Stortford	23/12/08	11 months
22/08/07	SPAD at Didcot North Junction	20/11/08	15 months
29/08/07	Overspeeding in ESR at Ty Mawr crossing	30/10/08	14 months
29/11/07	Accident east of Reading Station	28/10/08	11 months
23/02/07	Derailment at Grayrigg	23/10/08	20 months
29/08/07	Accident at Leatherhead	23/10/08	14 months
01/02/08	Collision with footbridge at Barrow-upon-Soar	25/09/08	7 months
10/08/07	Derailment at Duddlestone Junction	31/07/08	11½ months
27/08/07	Two trains in same section at Aylesbury	11/06/08	9½ months
19/07/07	Runaway wagons in Camden Rd Tunnel	22/05/08	10 months
12/09/06	Derailment at Croxton Level Crossing	13/05/08	20 months
28/01/07	Runaway and collision at Armathwaite	24/04/08	15 months
15/01/07	Derailment at Kemble	27/03/08	14½ months
13/01/07	Derailment in Hooley Cutting	28/02/08	13½ months
29/04/07	Trackworker fatality at Ruscombe Jnc	28/02/08	10 months

This is more than just a tick-box issue. It is vital that the wider industry is able to learn lessons from serious incidents - quickly and effectively - to ensure that safety improvement is delivered. Any responsible company will have systems in place to review the findings of inquiries and determine whether they raise issues relevant to its business. Hopefully they never bring to light any gaping managerial holes; they might though highlight an area where positive, proactive change could further enhance safety. Thus, RAIB's protracted timescales could potentially delay lower-level safety benefits which offer real value to those staff exposed to high levels of risk.

I put these concerns to the European Railway Agency which convenes the network of investigation bodies established under Directive 2004/49/EC. The “substantial delays” in the completion of RAIB’s inquiry reports are not news to the head of its Safety Unit - in fact the ERA has established a reminder procedure for investigation bodies and is working with them to generally advance the quality of reporting. In respect of the 12-month deadline, he made it clear that “there should be justified reasons if it is not met”.

RAIB informed me that it issues Urgent Safety Advice if, during the course of an inquiry, it unearths an issue which could compromise safety. It also claimed to delve deeper into the technical causes of an accident than was previously the case - efforts which inevitably impact on timescales. But in citing the exceptional accident at Grayrigg as an example, the impression was created of an organisation erecting a façade behind which it could hide broader failings.